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Prelude: The surprising spread of ‘human security’ discourse 
 
Although the language of ‗human security‘ that became prominent in the 1990s has 
encountered criticism from many sides, it has continued to gain momentum. One 
encounters it frequently now in discussions of environment, migration, socioeconomic 
rights, culture, gender and more, not only of physical security. Werthes and Debiel 
propose that: ‗human security provides a powerful ―political leitmotif‖ for particular 
states and multilateral actors by fulfilling selected functions in the process of agenda-
setting, decision-making and implementation‘ (2006:8). I suggest that in order to 
understand human security discourse and its spread this specification of actors and 
functions should be broadened. The relevant actors include more than states and 
multilateral agencies. What was primarily a language in United Nations circles is now 
far more. Like the sister idea of human rights, human security could be becoming an 
idiom that plays important roles in motivating and directing attention, and in problem 
recognition, diagnosis, evaluation and response. 
 
1 - The concept of ‘security’, in a human context 
 
The concept of ‗human security‘ redirects attention in discussions of security: from 
the national-/state- level to human beings as the potential victims; beyond physical 
violence as the only relevant threat/vector; and beyond physical harm as the only 
relevant damage. Scores of specific proposed definitions exist.
1
 ‗Human security‘ is 
discussed at different scales and with reference to threats of varying scope. Moving 
through from broader to narrower definitions: first, it can be treated as the security of 
the human species, or second, as the security of human individuals. Third, it may 
focus on severe, priority threats to individuals, as judged perhaps by mortality impacts 
or by the degree of felt disquiet. Fourth, the severe priority threats are sometimes 
limited to ‗freedom from want‘ and ‗freedom from fear‘, or fifthly, to only the latter. 
More narrowly still, sixthly, some authors wish to consider only threats to individuals 
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 See e.g. http://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/husec/Definitions.pdf, or the report of the Commission on 
Human Security (CHS, 2003). 
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brought through violence, or organised intentional violence, or, the narrowest 
conception yet (MacFarlane and Khong 2006: 245-7), only the threats to physical 
survival brought about through organised intentional violence. 
 In an earlier study (Gasper 2005) I organised a range of definitions in an analytical 
table, which Figure 1 now extends. The shaded cells show diverse possible 
definitions. Picciotto et al. (2007) for example cover both ‗freedom from fear‘ and 
‗freedom from want‘, using as weighting criterion the impact on human survival 
chances; and so they look at far more than direct deaths from armed violence. 
 
FIGURE 1: ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY (HS) (See Shaded Cells) 
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Before considering further the alternative formulations of human security, we should 
reflect on the concept of security and the significance of the term ‗human‘. 
 Objective/subjective. The ‗security‘ concept began as a subjective concept, from 
classical Rome, suggested Wolfers (1962). A subjective security concept must cover 
the range of whatever are felt as threats (Hough 2005). So too must an objective 
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 The Canadian government and its Human Security Network partners sometimes add ‗freedom from 
want‘ content to their ‗freedom from fear‘ centred interpretation of human security (MacFarlane & 
Khong: 227). A Human Security Network of medium powers was formed in 1999 by Canada, Norway, 
and several others. Mack (2005)‘s Human Security Report 2005 from Canada considers only physical 
violence, but all its effects. 
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 ‗Downturn with stability‘, a phrase used by Amartya Sen, refers to a downturn that maintains stability 
of basic needs fulfilment for everyone. 
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security concept insofar as feelings typically correspond to real possibilities, even if 
they are often misinformed about probabilities. We must still distinguish objective 
security and subjectively felt security given this poor correlation of magnitudes, one 
of the core paradoxes of security. Latvia‘s Human Development Report on human 
security noted that Latvian employs distinct terms for the two concepts. The priority 
threats felt subjectively by Latvians are easily understood but not automatically 
predictable: inability to pay for major medical care and old age; and fear of physical 
abuse at home and of abuse by officials, such as police (UNDP 2003). 
 Means/ends. Two further categories are important. One concerns the means that 
are intended to achieve safety or feeling safe. The experience of not feeling safe from 
the state bodies that are supposed to promote security and felt safety—a second 
classic paradox of security—led women in Hamber et al.‘s studies to make statements 
like: ‗For me the word security in Arabic is not to be afraid. First, not to be afraid to 
be hungry, to move, to think, and to be misjudged‘; ‗[Security is]…not being afraid, 
and that can be of physical violence but also feeling you have the right to do the 
things you want to do and say…‘; and even to a positing of ‗security‘ as a man‘s word 
and ‗safety‘ as a woman‘s word. The Bangladesh Human Development Report on 
human security found similarly that poor people felt less secure thanks to the police.  
 The other necessary additional category concerns being able to be safe. The 
Global Environmental Change and Human Security project (GECHS) treats human 
security as the capacity of individuals and communities to respond to threats to social, 
human and environmental rights. This formulation leaves people with the 
responsibility to use that capacity, gives recognition to communities, and gives them 
space to prioritise threats.  
 Claiming priority. Security claims are claims of existential threat (Buzan et al. 
1998), meant to justify priority response, including overriding of other claims or 
rights. Attempts to limit such prioritisation to one type of threat (such as threats of 
physical damage from physical violence) and/or one type of referent/target (such as 
the state) are artificial. The root and usages of the term ‗security‘ also validate no such 
restriction; according to Rothschild (1995) for centuries the term applied only to 
individuals. More recently, following suggestions by for example Juan Somavia and 
others in the South American Peace Commission in the 1980s, Lincoln Chen and Ken 
Booth at the start of the 1990s, and a generation earlier by Johan Galtung, Kenneth 
Boulding and others in peace research (Bilgin 2003), the UNDP‘s 1993 and 1994 
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Human Development Reports led by Mahbub ul Haq established a broad meaning for 
human security, in terms of a range of types of threat. Some formulations go so far as 
to discuss human security in terms of all threats to internationally ratified human 
rights, though this can weaken the prioritising thrust and has to be balanced by the 
next idea, that of basic thresholds.  
 Justifying priority:- understanding the human referent for security; normative 
thresholds. One must not merely claim priority but have a plausible basis for it. Some 
of the debate on human security considers at length the concept of ‗security‘, and not 
enough the content of ‗human‘, as if that has no relevance to the issue of justification. 
To mention the individual as one referent for the concept of security is not enough. 
Attention is required to the nature of the referent. Central to being human is that we 
are embodied persons, but not only that. Being human has various specific 
requirements. From these specific needs come socially-specific notions of a series of 
normative thresholds across a range of needs: minimum levels required for normative 
acceptability. So, ‗human security‘ issues in the area of health, for example, do not 
include all health issues, only those up to a minimum normatively set threshold, even 
though that is to some degree historically, and often societally, specific. (See e.g. 
Owen 2005; Gasper 2005.) Lack of the threshold distinction leads to a concern to 
exclude whole issue areas like health from the remit of ‗security‘, mistakenly 
believing that this is necessary in order to allow meaningful priority to anything (see 
e.g. MacFarlane & Khong 2006).  
 Justifying priority:– interconnection, nexuses and tipping points. A typical aspect 
of justifying priority is to identify a major causal connection from fulfilment or non-
fulfilment of the highlighted factor, through to a qualitatively different set of other 
things that have clear normative importance. This is the notion of a nexus, a major 
connection, at least in some situations, between different ‗spheres‘—for example 
between environment and peace or war—and thus from one thing to many others. The 
discourse of insecurity often proposes a particular type of connection: a causal 
threshold, flashpoint or tipping point, a stress level beyond which dramatic escalation 
of negative effects occurs, bringing even collapse. For example, beyond certain levels 
and combinations of stress factors, drastically increased damage happens to human 
health, including life expectancy; some combinations bring premature death. Violent 
death scenarios, let alone violent deaths intentionally promoted by others, are only 
one type of premature death scenario. Suicides by heavily indebted farmers have 
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become frequent in parts of India. Arguably, whole societies too can go over a stress 
tipping-point. 
 Structural limits are central to human security analysis. Beyond the limits, things 
snap. The ‗weak sustainability‘ hope in environmental economics is inapplicable 
outside certain bounds; less environmental capital cannot always be substituted for by 
having more of another type: human, social, or human-built physical capital. 
Destabilization of the Earth‘s regenerative and climate cycles cannot be compensated 
for by more of other capital types.  
 To review, ‗security issues‘ concern risks of being or falling below minimum 
normative thresholds. Security means ‗holding on‘ or ‗holding firm‘, to core values. 
Especially serious are cases with significant possibilities of collapse; yet while a 
famine where a social system has collapsed is a prime example of lack of human 
security, chronic capacity-sapping malnutrition is an example too. Normative 
thresholds and causal thresholds can be connected; for when a normative threshold is 
breached a person may erupt, against others or herself, or collapse.  
 Justifying priority:– issues of responsibility and intentionality. Should we consider 
as human security issues all matters that involve threats to basic values, or only those 
which are intentionally caused and which are not the victim‘s own responsibility (thus 
excluding for example smoking-related disease)? Matters which are victims‘ own 
responsibility are already excluded by a focus on capability to be safe. MacFarlane & 
Khong‘s definition—threats to our physical survival caused by intentional organized 
violence—goes further and excludes unintentional damage. Their definition is still a 
human security conception, since it concerns threats to persons, individuals; but is 
very narrow. It excludes climate change from our purview, not only because the 
threats are not (all) of physical violence but because there is no conscious perpetrator 
of harm, and supposedly in order to give ‗analytical traction‘ (p.250). We return to 
their choice later, and suggest that it confuses short-term policy convenience with 
analytical power.  
 Security as a visceral concept. Security is not just a prioritising, claiming concept. 
The way that humans have evolved, the way our consciousnesses are structured, some 
events and things disturb us, destabilise us. Combined with ‗human‘, ‗security‘ 
conveys a visceral, lived feel, connecting to people‘s fears and feelings or to an 
observer‘s fears and feelings about others‘ lives. ‗Human security‘ thus evokes a 
sense of real lives and persons. Like ‗rights‘, it touches something deep in our 
 6 
awareness. Part of that may concern the human priority to avoiding losses more than 
making gains. Losses mean losses of meaning and identity, not merely of things. 
 Human security as an integrative concept.  ‗Human security‘ captures what some 
other concepts cover, and goes further. Like basic needs analysis it gives substance to 
the language of ‗development‘, a language to talk about significant change that did 
not yet tell us anything about the contents of that significance. It then adds to what 
basic needs analysis conveys, by for example its stronger link to feelings (Gasper 
2005). It helps to give a sense of direction and priority too within rights language, 
which is about the form of a priority claim but not necessarily about its content or 
rationale, and which otherwise can bring an absolutization of the convenience and 
property of the powerful (Gasper 2007). 
 The human security concept thus concerns the assurance for individuals (and 
societies, and the species) of normatively basic threshold levels in priority areas. It 
connects a series of ideas: objectively and subjectively felt security; normative 
priorities for what it is to be human, including a sense of meaning and identification; 
causal nexuses, tipping-points, and awareness of possibilities of collapse. We see 
thereby that there is a discourse of ‗human security‘, not just a single concept. Indeed, 
if we highlight different inclusions and emphases we can distinguish a family of 
discourses.  
 
2 - Components of the ‘human security’ discourse(s) 
 
In an earlier paper I examined ‗human security‘, in particular the UNDP human 
security approach, as a discourse that employs the concept and label but includes 
more (Gasper 2005). Elements of the discourse were specified as follows. The first 
four elements are shared with UNDP‘s sister discourse of ‗human development‘:- 
 A heightened normative focus on individuals‘ lives 
 More specifically, a focus on reasoned freedoms, the ability of persons and 
groups of persons to achieve outcomes that they have reason to value 
 ‗Joined-up thinking‘ (Gasper & Truong 2005) that looks at the 
interconnections between conventionally separated spheres (different polities; 
polity-economy-society-ecosystems), and not least at the nexus between 
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freedoms from want and indignity and freedom from fear. Correspondingly it 
tries to build policy coherence across conventionally separated spheres. 
 A global span normatively as well as for explanatory purposes; covering all 
persons, world-wide, as in human rights discourse.
4
 
Human security discourse adds at least the following elements: 
 A focus on basic needs  
 More specifically, an insistence on basic rights for all. This strengthens the 
focus on individuals, compared to in the human needs and human 
development traditions, notes O‘Brien in this volume. 
 A concern for the stability as well as average levels of important freedoms. 
These additional elements contribute to give a stronger motivational basis than in the 
original Human Development Approach. It helps to mobilise attention and concern 
and to sustain a global normative commitment, ‗joined-up feeling‘.  
 This is a complex package notion of ‗human security‘. It was too complex for 
MacFarlane and Khong, the international relations specialists who were 
commissioned to discuss the notion for the UN Intellectual History Project. They miss 
the basic needs point about minimum required levels, which differentiates human 
security work from the pure human development approach.
5
 Likewise, they suggest 
wrongly that the Commission on Human Security‘s report (CHS 2003) was concerned 
only with stability, not primarily with levels.
6
 
 Let us examine more fully the various elements and how they fit together. The 
first heading below relates especially to what O‘Brien (2009) calls the equity 
dimension in human security thinking. The next two headings relate to what she calls 
its connectivity dimensions. 
 Humanism – I: integrating the international ‘human’ discourses.  Human security 
work synthesises ideas from the preceding ‗human discourses‘ of human 
development, human needs, and human rights (Gasper 2007). As Richard Jolly 
highlights, human rights language gave an independent value status to prioritised 
                                                 
4
 I have called this ‗joined-up feeling‘ (Gasper and Truong 2005, Gasper 2007). In recent work Sen 
calls it ‗globally unrestricted coverage‘ (Sen 2007). 
5
 ‗Human development, for example, is a sensible concept in its own right. Conflating it with security 
produces conceptual confusion. … the rebranding of development as security‘ (MacFarlane & Khong, 
p.17). 
6
 ‗[we make] an examination of the report of the Commission on Human Security, which made a strong 
case for viewing human security as the protection of individuals from the vulnerabilities associated 
with sudden economic downturns‘ (MacFarlane & Khong, p.16). 
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individual freedoms, and a universal scope of consideration. It implied obligations on 
states to meet these priorities, and implied legitimate recourse by persons without 
those rights, to hold states accountable (Jolly et al. 2004: 187). To supplement this, 
‗the human development approach introduces the idea of scarcity of resources, the 
need to establish priorities, and sequencing of achievement in the promotion of human 
rights‘ (Jolly et al. 2004: 177). Human security language combines the human rights 
insistence on the importance of each individual, with a human development insistence 
on priority sequencing given the scarcity of resources.  
 The heightened normative focus on individuals‘ lives gives human security 
thinking a radical thrust. Picciotto, for example, adopts a life-years denominator rather 
than the Human Development Index as primary performance measure. We should not 
trade-off extra years of life for people who live only forty years, against an increase in 
average per capita income. Instead we should take as a priority human right a life span 
of, say, three score years and ten, the natural span that is relatively easily attainable 
and only with much greater difficulty extendable. It is the life span that has been 
attained and assured at relatively low per capita income in places like China, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, Kerala and Sri Lanka. 
 Humanism – II: a holistic perspective at the level of the individual. We find in 
human security work an anthropological type concern for understanding how 
individual persons live, that provides microfoundations for explanatory macrotheory. 
People seek security, of various sorts: bodily, material, psychological and existential 
(including via family, friends, esteem, systems of meanings). All of this is long 
familiar, but regularly forgotten. One recent locus of such understanding has been the 
basic needs school in conflict studies from the 1970s on (John Burton et al.). Human 
security thinking has given it a more capacious home. This holistic perspective at 
individual-level gives a broader (UNDP) perspective on human security decisive 
advantages over a narrower (Canadian) perspective, let alone the MacFarlane-Khong 
variant.
 
 
 Trans- or supra-disciplinary explanatory synthesis: a (selective) holistic approach 
at the level of larger systems.  At supra-individual levels, human security thinking 
stresses the interaction of economic, political, social, cultural, epidemiological, 
military and other systems that have conventionally been treated separately in 
research and policy. This ‗joined-up thinking‘ is holistic in spirit but not totalising in 
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scope; the particular interconnections to be stressed will be selected according to their 
importance case-by-case.  
 Several interviewees in the UN Intellectual History Project express this holistic 
spirit:  
‗the basic premise of the [UN] charter, that you really can‘t have peace unless the rights of nations 
great and small are equally respected. … [and] the basic premise of the Declaration of Human 
Rights, that you can‘t have peace within a country unless the rights of all, great or small, are 
equally respected‘ (Virendra Dayal, quoted by Weiss et al. 2005: 151). 
‗…all the conflicts that [some rich governments] are giving rise to in an interdependent world 
precisely by ignoring the human rights and the democratic principles that they supposedly espouse‘ 
(Lourdes Arizpe, quoted by Weiss et al., 2005: 415). 
Juan Somavia, who ran the 1995 Copenhagen summit on social development that took 
steps down the broader human security path, noted how ‗the constitution of the 
ILO…already in 1919, says that peace is linked to social justice‘, and quoted Pope 
Paul VI‘s declaration in 1969 at an ILO conference that ‗Development is the new 
dimension of peace‘ (both cited by Weiss et al., 2005: 299). Outweighing such ideas 
though: ‗The whole system has pushed, pushed, in educational terms, towards 
specialization, when the reality of the world has been pushing more and more towards 
integration‘ (Somavia, cited on p.429). Educational narrowing blinds us to 
interconnection and helps to generate new threats. As Zygmunt Bauman describes, 
extreme intellectual specialisation—‗close-focusing‘ of the types done so successfully 
in science and technology—leads to waves of unforeseen effects when we act on the 
resulting powerful but narrow knowledge. It has led us into Ulrich Beck‘s ‗Risk 
Society‘, where every ‗advance‘ creates new messes and ‗the line beyond which the 
risks become totally unmanageable and damages irreparable may be crossed at any 
moment‘ (Bauman 1994: 29).  
 Figure 2 identifies more specifically the interconnections which are meant to 
justify and be revealed by ‗joined-up thinking‘. Brauch presents four traditional foci, 
which imply six types of possible major bilateral interconnection. Though Brauch 
uses ‗security‘ to mean security against violence (or even only inter-state violence), 
and his table presents the interconnections in terms of binary relations, each side of 
each binary relation is linked to all the other foci. The human security research 
programme posits that in at least some important cases the interconnections are 
ramifying and major, and require us to move beyond traditional problem-framings.  
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Figure 2: The Conceptual Quartet and Six Linkages (from Brauch 2005) 
 Peace                                 Security 
              Security dilemma 
 
Sustain-                              Survival 
able                                       di- 
peace                                  lemma 
 
 
Development              Environment 
         Sustainable development 
 
This holistic spirit has a grand sweep, but are the declared linkages adequately 
established? The linkage from carbon-based economic growth to global climate 
change is more than sufficiently demonstrated. Regarding economic performance and 
conflict, Paul Collier et al.‘s 2003 study for the World Bank showed a strong 
correlation of violent conflict with both poverty and low growth. 
By analyzing 52 major civil wars between 1960 and 1999 it found that the common thread 
was often a poor and declining economy combined with a heavy dependence on exports of 
natural resources such as diamonds, gold or oil. "Some countries are more prone to civil wars 
than others but distant history and ethnic tensions are rarely the best explanations," Paul 
Collier, lead author of the report, said in a statement. "Instead look at a nation's recent past 
and, most important, its economic conditions." (World Bank Press Review: May 15, 2003)  
Next, linkages to poor and declining economic conditions in low-income countries 
from aspects of international economic policy and other policies of rich countries 
have become increasingly obvious.  
 Rich countries have restricted Southern trade access to their markets, notably in 
agriculture, and yet expected no consequences: no emigrants, no conflicts, no 
spillover of stress or suffering. Much recent literature has demonstrated how ‗the 
new local wars that have come to dominate the global geography of violence are 
the natural consequence of formal rules that make the criminal economy of illegal 
trafficking in drugs, weapons and people far more attractive to poor and 
marginalised countries than legal economic pursuits‘ (Picciotto 2005: 3). 
 Rich countries have energetically exported arms and imagined these will not be 
used. ‗Most weapon-exporting countries provide export credit guarantees for 
weapons purchases by developing countries‘ (Picciotto, 2005: 6). 
 Rich countries imposed bone-crunching economic structural adjustment on low 
income countries and expected no wider consequences. An income shock of -5% 
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raises chances of civil war by 50% (Picciotto et al., 2006). Prior to the 1994 
Rwanda genocide, the country faced an income decline of 40% as IMF-imposed 
adjustment was piled on top of the effects of slump in the world coffee market. 
The economic impacts of civil wars are themselves so immense (e.g. ‗In Rwanda, 
Bosnia and Lebanon GDP fell to 46%, 27% and 24% of the pre-conflict peaks‘, 
ibid., p.6) as to thereby greatly raise the chances of perpetuation of the war. 
 As a latest aspect of policy incoherence, international policies on governance have 
blocked aid to states that are adjudged to not already have good governance, and 
thereby undermined international security policy. 
 
3 - Roles 
 
The idea of ‗human security‘ plays various roles: firstly it provides a shared language, 
that highlights and proclaims a new perspective in investigation; secondly, it guides 
evaluations, through its emphasis on certain priority performance criteria; thirdly, it 
guides positive analyses, through its emphases on which outcomes are important to 
explain and which determinants are legitimate to include; fourthly, it similarly focuses 
attention in policy design, by directing attention to a particular range of outcomes as 
being important to influence and a particular range of means as being relevant to 
consider; and fifthly, it motivates action in certain directions, through the types of 
value which it highlights and the range of types of experience to which it leads us to 
attend. 
In earlier work on human security thinking in or linked to the UN system I 
have tried to elucidate these roles.
7
 The first column of Figure 3 below summarises 
the arguments, drawing also on the previous sections of this chapter. Behind the 
familiar features—a focus on individuals not only on generalized categories such as 
national income or averages, and a wider scope both of the areas considered under 
‗security‘ and of attention to contributory factors—lie the deeper commitments: the 
motivating concern of ‗joined-up feeling‘, partnered by the holistic vision of wide-
ranging attention to human experience and interconnections therein.  
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 Gasper (2005, 2007, 2008), Gasper & Truong (2005). 
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Figure 3: The Components and Roles of the Idea and Discourse of Human Security 
 
ISSUE AREAS GASPER (2005, 2007, 2008) WERTHES-BOSOLD (2005, 2006, 2007) 
 
Roles of an idea / 
discourse 
1. To provide a shared language, for 
shared and mutually supportive 
investigation  
2. To guide evaluations  
3. To guide positive analysis  
4. To focus attention in policy design 
 
5. To motivate 
Multiple roles of an intellectual 
framework:  
(Werthes & Debiel: 12) 
 
1. Explanation and orientation 
2. Coordination and action-related decision 
guidance 
3. Motivation and mobilisation 
1 – To provide a 
shared language 
Besides a concept, ‗human security‘ is 
also: 
- A discourse, whose elements are 
asterisked below 
- * A striking and evocative label 
Within this shared language people can 
flexibly respond to their own situation and 
own priorities.  Yet it also provides, in 
overlap areas, a frame ‗for concerted 
policy projects, par excellence illustrated 
in the [Human Security Network]‘ 
(Werthes & Bosold 2006: 23). 
2 – Provides a focus 
for looking at effects; 
this guides evaluations 
and analysis 
(to determine: what is 
security?) 
A normative focus on individuals‘ lives, 
viz: 
* Focus on individuals‘ reasoned freedoms 
* A concern for stability as well as levels 
(italics indicate extensions beyond the 
Human Development Approach) 
(a) From state focus to individual focus;  
this is the first of Werthes & Bosold’s four 
elements of a proposed shared core, 2006: 
25; also Bosold & Werthes 2005: 99). 
Policy language provides one instrument 
for holding its users accountable (Werthes 
& Bosold 2006) 
2* - Human focus * JUF: ‗Joined-up feeling‘, for all 
individuals – this is the spirit of human 
rights (HRs) discourse 
(b) ‗ People should have the opportunity to 
live decently and without threats to their 
survival‘  
[Humanity] Edson:  ‗human security is about 
protecting the common good‘ (2001: 84)  
 
Who decides what is 
security and what is a 
threat? 
Not necessarily only the state (though that 
is one major actor).  
Can be individuals, groups, … 
 
3 – Provides a 
principle for 
considering causes: it 
guides analysis 
* JUT: ‗Joined-up thinking‘ (Gasper 2008) Greatly expanded scope of analytical 
attention 
4 – Provides a focus 
for policy response 
Prioritising (which is inherent in the 
‗security‘ label):  
* A focus on basic needs  
* Basic rights for all. 
At the same time, Joined-up thinking   
-  broadly conceived policy response,  
and:  
- awareness of impossibility of full 
knowledge of relevant factors  a 
deliberative, learning style in policy 
(Truong 2005). 
Policy style:  
(1) the large normative frame can 
influence other policy too (Werthes & 
Bosold 2006: 23); promote coherence; 
(2) impossibility of unilateral control [their 
point c; 2006:25] ‗Safety threats must be 
addressed through multilateral processes…  
and by taking into account the patterns of 
interdependence that characterize the 
globalized world in which we are living‘ 
[point d; Bosold & Werthes 2005: 89, 99]. 
Whose responsibility 
to respond? 
Not necessarily only the state, which may 
lack the capacity 
 
5 - Motivation Focus on basic needs and rights, including 
through an evocative label and concern 
for stability  stronger motivational 
basis, mobilizing attention and concern: 
sustaining Joined-up Feeling 
Werthes & Bosold (2006: 32): the focus on 
individuals appeals to a broader range of 
actors, not to states alone. 
What relation to 
discourses of 
development? 
Goes further than discourses of human 
development, in the areas indicated above 
in italics 
 
What relation to 
discourses of need? 
Relies on a notion of need, as reasoned 
fundamental priority  
 
What relation to 
discourses of human 
rights? 
 Basic rights for all 
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A human security research program in the universities of Marburg and Duisburg in 
Germany complements this UN-centred research through its investigations of the 
‗Human Security Network‘ of Canada, Norway, et al., and of the work of Japan and 
the European Union.
8
 Figure 3 compares the Marburg-Duisburg work and my picture 
of components and roles, and gives illustrations and extensions for both 
specifications. The German work too is organised by a perspective on what are the 
roles of a human security intellectual framework. It specifies three: 1. Explanation and 
orientation, 2. Coordination and action-related decision guidance, and 3. Motivation 
and mobilisation. They correspond to the last three roles I proposed. Let us explore 
some of these roles further. 
 Unexpected insights and situation-specific understandings. In explanation, the 
human security approach provides fresh situation-specific understandings and 
insights, by applying a non-conventional boundary-crossing perspective in ways 
tailormade to specific cases. Jolly and BasuRay (2007) have reviewed the many 
national Human Development Reports focused on human security, to test what if 
anything the perspective adds. The mandate to look broadly at sources of insecurity, 
but to be selective according to the particular concerns, constellations and connections 
extant in a particular country, generates unexpected and practical diagnoses and 
proposals. The analyses are restricted neither by arbitrary a priori disciplinary habits 
in regard to scope, nor by fixed prescriptions or proscriptions from a global centre 
about what should be included or excluded. Further examples along these lines are 
found in work that uses a human security approach to consider environmental and 
climate change, such as by Jon Barnett and Karen O‘Brien. 
 Focusing policy design on foundational prevention rather than crisis 
management. In policy design, a human security perspective emphasises system re-
design to reduce chances of crises rather than palliative measures when crises have 
hit. Lodgaard (2000) argued that: 
In the human security paradigm, a distinction may be drawn between foundational prevention and 
crisis prevention. [Ginkel & Newman (2000).] Foundational prevention is premised on the belief 
that prevention cannot begin early enough. It tries to address deep-seated causes of human 
insecurity. ―Inequality, deprivation, social exclusion, and denial of access to political power are a 
                                                 
8
 Coming from a state security / International Relations background, and with a focus on the Human 
Security Network countries, some of this work may underplay the Basic Needs and Human Rights 
aspects in the UN-Japan line of human security discourse, and mistakenly separate them from physical 
security -- as if physical security is not part of basic needs, and as if one does not fear lack of basic 
necessities (see Werthes & Bosold 2006, p.25; Bosold & Werthes 2005: 86.)  
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recipe for a breakdown of social norms and order. Not having a fair chance in life…being deprived 
of hope... are the most incendiary root causes of violence and conflict‖. [Ginkel & Newman 
(2000).] To remove such causes requires a long-term strategy for equitable, culturally sensitive, 
and representative development. … [Paragraph 51]  
Preventive action is vastly more cost-effective than belated interventions to try to 
solve crises once they have exploded, for example trying to supply emergency relief 
and build peace when a war has erupted (see e.g. Gasper 1999). Lodgaard warned 
however that ‗textbook logic advocates preventive action while political logic 
suggests that action would have to wait till a crisis emerges‘ (paragraph 81); and that 
‗it is doubtful whether textbook logic and political logic can be reconciled unless the 
United Nations gets its own independent source(s) of finance‘ (paragraph 82).  
 In reaction to the record of political convenience and analytical ease being placed 
above policy coherence, the human security concept now serves ‗as a focal point 
around which an integrated approach to global governance is emerging‘ (Betts & 
Eagleton-Pierce 2005: 7). Let us ask next: emerging from whom? 
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 Roles for, and in relation to, whom? In motivation and mobilisation, the human 
security approach finds listeners more readily amongst some types of audiences than 
others. Firstly, many general purpose international organisations, notably in the UN 
system, are seeking to integrate and make sense of their endeavours (and existence), 
justify and prioritise their activities. This includes, not least, the UN system apex and 
UNESCO. In addition, some special purpose international organisations seek to 
identify key interconnections that decisively affect their area of responsibility and to 
identify the connections which show their own importance. 
 Secondly, some types of government have been attracted to the human security 
language: notably medium- and small-powers who are seeking a distinctive identity 
for their foreign policy, a purposefulness, meaningfulness and moral tone, and a niche 
for distinctive value-addition. Since the human security framework draws attention to 
a great range of possible interconnections, it is perhaps not surprising that a relatively 
high proportion of observed users should be states, for their responsibilities span this 
range. 
 Thirdly, we see uses by various social movements and civil society actors. The 
approach appeals to some progressive social movements trying to influence national 
and global policy directly or via influencing national and global society. It appeals to 
some feminists, and to a considerable variety of academics and intellectuals—in 
international relations, development studies, global social policy, public health, peace 
studies, etc.—seeking a policy-relevant intellectual framework for the 21st century. 
 Who has not adopted a human security language and framework? Relatively 
speaking, the big powers—compared to their degree of use of human rights 
discourse—but increased attention to global public goods might be changing this. 
Perhaps also private corporations, again in comparison to the take-up of human rights 
language, but this too may be changing. In research circles, human rights studies does 
not seem much aware of its sister framework, while mainstream security studies has 
often resisted it, as we see later. Arguably, the framework has also been less taken up 
by national governments in their domestic analyses, compared to human development 
and human rights discourses. Lee stresses that ‗most Asian governments are unlikely 
to adopt a human security definition that contains political constraints or economic 
directives‘ (2004: 37-8), i.e. that is seen to imply international rights to intervene or 
sanction a country in light of externally adjudged violations of either civil rights or 
economic-social rights, or to overrule countries‘ own cultures and traditions. The 
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situation may be gradually changing. The very fear of undiluted human rights regimes 
makes some Asian governments prefer the more complex human security perspective. 
And while the national Human Development Reports that have taken human security 
as their theme are not directly owned by governments—the exercises have a quasi-
autonomous status in order to ensure independent creative work—they have had 
significant government consultation and involvement. 
 Overall we could say that a human security perspective, like the thinking around 
human development, uses a global context and globally-oriented criteria of relevance. 
It tries to bring integration within the thinking of internationally-oriented agencies, by 
reference to priority criteria. In particular, it is guided by concerns with major threats 
and risks of crisis. According to Bosold and Werthes, the core use then of a human 
security approach has been in multilateral action to address priority threats to 
individual humans. Perception and formulation of what are the priority threats will 
vary; that flexibility provides space for diverse participants, and a sharper definition is 
not needed for a policy movement (Bosold & Werthes 2005: 100-101). 
 Werthes and Bosold check how far the talk of the Human Security Network 
countries is only talk. They conclude that it has some real impact. It ‗has resulted in 
processes and developments which bring claims/pretension and substantiveness more 
in accordance with each other‘ (Werthes & Bosold 2006: 28). As an example: after 
the success of the 1990s Ottawa process to ban anti-personnel landmines, the Network 
moved on to try to control trade in small arms and light weapons. This was done only 
with reference to illegal trade, for several leading members (Austria, Switzerland, 
Canada, even Norway; as well as observer South Africa) are major small arms 
exporters, and several have not been distinguished for membership in or 
implementation of international agreements. Yet despite that restriction, the human 
security rhetoric has provided a valuable instrument for holding its users accountable 
for their other actions (Werthes & Bosold 2006). 
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4 - Attacks on the idea of ‘human security’  
I: Attacks on the very idea -  by claims about definition or about value priorities 
Some attacks on human security thinking concern the scope of issues it covers, but 
some object to the very notion, even when more narrowly conceived. Conventional 
security studies authors often assert that security is essentially a national-level and 
military notion. Sometimes their claim is about established usage: ‗…human security 
emerged in a context in which security was predominantly conceived of in national 
terms‘, propose MacFarlane & Khong (p.233). In reality the term ‗social security‘ is 
long and deeply entrenched, and the concept of  psychological security has been in 
use for yet longer (cf. Rothschild 1995). MacFarlane & Khong themselves still adopt 
a notion of human security, though one of narrow scope, as we will see. Second, some 
claim that indisputable priority is a necessary condition for use of the ‗security‘ label, 
and that to use the term ‗security‘ for non-military matters greatly overvalues their 
importance, which should be left to be judged instead in democratic elections. But 
then should not military threats also be judged through elections? Further, there is no 
reason why any prioritising mechanism will always prioritise military above non-
military threats. The perspective of considering key threats to persons can be applied 
in many arenas. It is presumptuous for any one arena to claim proprietorial and 
exclusive rights.  
 A second form of attack proposes that security is a fearful ignoble craving, 
compared to the true ethical currency, freedom. The attack lacks foundation, for 
freedom rests on security, and, further, we wish to secure freedoms—though indeed 
basic freedoms, not everything. Both freedom and security have been emphases in 
elaborating human development discourse; both are prominent in for example 
Amartya Sen‘s work.  
II: Attacks on policy grounds: Human Security discourse is part of a dangerous 
agenda for world government, or no government – and is un-American…  
As with human rights discourse, mistrust comes from more than one side of the 
political spectrum. The G77 carry suspicions that Human Security discourse 
legitimates intervention by stronger powers. In contrast, a Heritage Foundation report 
on human security (Carafano & Smith 2006) complains—despite having cited the UN 
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Charter‘s commitment ‗to employ international machinery for the promotion of the 
economic and social advancement of all peoples‘—as follows:  
Over the course of decades, the U.N. bureaucracy has come to see its role as facilitating not 
only peace and security, but also human rights, development, and social equity. … it is 
understandable that Americans question the U.N.‘s seemingly constant pursuit of binding 
documents on themes that purportedly would advance security or development but in actuality 
would restrain U.S. power and leadership and undermine America‘s democratic and free-
market practices. … Providing for the security and public safety of citizens is a principal 
attribute of national sovereignty. Indeed, nation-states that are democracies are best prepared 
to fill this role because their leaders are held accountable by the governed. … Shifting the 
focus of security policy from the collective will of free people to provide for their common 
defense to one of protecting a range of individual and collective political, economic, and 
cultural ―rights‖ as defined by international bodies or non-state actors like NGOs confuses the 
nature of the modern state‘s roles and responsibilities. (Carafano and Smith, 2006) 
Similarly, MacFarlane & Khong insinuate that human security discourse can 
undermine the authority of the State, the only body able to do much about human 
security concerns. In reality fact human security discourse is clear on the primary role 
of the national State. |The critics appear to believe implausibly that talk of any limits 
to the role of the State will undermine it. 
 
III: Objections to a broad conception:  further claims from definition  
MacFarlane and Khong do not seek to restrict security language to the national level, 
but they attack the UN-UNDP-Japanese conception of human security which provides 
for inclusion of a broad range of threats. Sometimes, formally, they accept that 
allocation to threats of the priority status of ‗security‘ language must depend on one‘s 
values, but in general they are not content with this. 
 First, they often presume terminological proprietorship. Thus environmental 
threats are explicitly marginalized: ‗the core of the debate on human security revolves 
around development and protection‘, they stipulate (p.141). They try to reserve the 
term ‗protection‘ exclusively for protection of life against violent attack, as if 
protection of health, and protection of anything else against anything else, does not 
constitute ‗protection‘. Proponents of such a narrow conception ‗make the shift to the 
individual in theory, but ignore it in practice by subjectively limiting what does and 
does not count as a viable threat … [It] is communicable disease, which kills 
18,000,000 people a year, not violence, which kills several hundred thousand, that is 
the real threat to individuals‘ (Owen 2005: 38). Owen here means military style 
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violence, and we should add that: ‗It is estimated that each year 1.5 to 3 million girls 
and women are killed through gender-related violence‘ (Hamber et al, 2006: 499). 
Climatic movements combined with planned neglect by colonial regimes to leave tens 
of millions dead in the late 19th century (Davis 2001); we face a parallel prospect in 
the 21st. MacFarlane and Khong‘s approach is thus better entitled a ‗security studies 
approach‘ rather than ‗protection-based‘. It reflects the proprietorial claim that 
conventional ‗security studies‘ feels toward the term ‗security‘.  
 
IV: Attacks on policy grounds – lack of prioritising power? 
 MacFarlane and Khong claim that broad human security discourse renders itself 
vacuous by including everything. Does it divert us from prioritisation? The work on 
Millennium Development Goals shows otherwise, both for prioritisation of areas and 
within areas. This operationalisation of parts of a human security perspective by Haq 
and his close associates (originally under the title ‗International Development Targets‘ 
in the mid 1990s) centres on prioritising. MacFarlane and Khong fail to distinguish 
between prioritising between areas and within areas. Priority belongs not to a whole 
issue area per se but to basic levels of achievement therein. They recurrently 
misunderstand this, as in their attack on ‗redefining human development or health or 
environmental issues as security issues‘ (p.264). Attainment and maintenance of the 
basic standards in these areas, but not of every matter in them, are issues of human 
security.  
Prioritisation between areas is especially controversial. It represents the type of 
textbook logic that Lodgaard reminds us runs up against political ‗logic‘, the 
convenience of established interests. For Picciotto et al. (2007) and Jolly et al. (2004) 
such comparisons are central. A broad-scope human security concept is needed to 
generate the required types of comparison: can we better promote security through 
military spending or through women‘s education or democracy education or… ? Jolly 
reports how smallpox was eradicated in the late 1960s and 70s for just US $300 
million, a cost equal to that of three fighter-bombers.
9
   
While keen to prioritise between areas, human security analysis mistrusts 
invariable prioritizations of large areas. Beyond the elementary priorities such as mass 
immunization and access to oral rehydration therapy it prefers a case-by-case 
                                                 
9
 Speech at the New School University, New York, 20 September 2007. 
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approach. Broadness of general focus allows relevant prioritisation in situ, because 
one can then seek to identify the particular vulnerabilities that are actually prevalent, 
and felt as priorities, in particular cases (Jolly & BasuRay 2007). Its broad approach is 
not a call for total analysis but for flexible analysis, instead of focusing by a priori 
disciplinary habit or prioritising by global over-generalisations.
10
 
 
V: Attacks on grounds of scope and explanatory force 
MacFarlane and Khong, Mack and others claim that the broad conception ‗lacks 
analytical traction‘. It adopts ‗the predictive/explanatory hypotheses that a broad set 
of aspects not conventionally connected in theory are often importantly connected in 
reality: including that the economic, social, cultural, medical, political and military 
are not separate systems; and that neither national nor personal security will be 
secured by military means alone‘ (Gasper 2005: 228). A growing number of analysts, 
of many backgrounds, find this broader framing fruitful, though typically with some 
selective focusing according to the case considered. Health impact assessments of 
foreign policy, including international economic relations, are one important 
illustration
11; assessments of climate change‘s consequences for conflict are another. 
12
 The connections in Brauch‘s conceptual quartet (Figure 2) or any similar sketch 
mean that interest in any one of the set will typically require deep attention to several 
of them. 
 
VI: Attacks on policy grounds – lack of influence? 
In the short run, human security notions are often hard to apply in policy, because of 
problems concerning who cares and disagreements over who is responsible for action 
and who pays, reflecting the boundary-crossing character of the issues considered. 
Mack proposes it is better to have a narrow vivid focus (on violent threats to 
                                                 
10
 For example, while a global econometric study might find no relation between inequality and 
conflict, in reality in some situations inequality may conduce to peace and in other situations to 
conflict, so that we need differentiation rather than a global generalisation. See also Barnett (this 
volume) on misdirection through over-generalised analysis. 
11
 See e.g. special issue of Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, March 2007, 85(3). 
12
 Note for example the broadening of the range of threats and pathways considered in a 2007 CNA 
report on the security implications of climate change: ‗The report includes several formal findings: 
Projected climate change poses a serious threat to America's national security; Climate change acts as a 
threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world; Projected climate 
change will add to tensions even in stable regions of the world; Climate change, national security and 
energy dependence are a related set of global challenges.‘ (ECSP News, 14 June 2007, Woodrow 
Wilson Center; http://securityandclimate.cna.org/) 
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individuals) because that captures attention and builds up sympathy which may later 
spread to dealing with other types of threat (MacArthur 2007: 3); broad scope is 
considered not politically feasible in relation to rich country audiences. Implicit here 
is a short-run perspective of immediate appeal to current powerholders. Ignoring 
prevention and threats other than physical violence may in fact be shortsighted rather 
than hardheaded; it may lead not to eventual spread of concern, but to waste and later 
panic and evasion. Concentration on military interventions and subsequent ‗patch-
up/botch-up‘ efforts does not give a basis for building sympathy. It matches the short-
run convenience of dominant interests in rich countries, who do not want to have 
causes of disasters traced far and fingers pointed at them.  
 In the short run, albeit perversely, the Japanese-backed broad picture such as in 
the Ogata-Sen report was ‗marginalized by the ongoing war on terror‘ (Bosold & 
Werthes 2005: 97). The ‗narrow‘ Canadian version appears to have been used at the 
2005 World Summit of the United Nations, as well as by the UN Security Council in 
Resolution 1674 in April 2006 (MacArthur 2007: 3). Responsibility to protect from 
severe threats of physical violence is taken on, but with no mention of other types of 
threat. The broader version so challenges vested interests that it represents a longer 
run agenda, just like human rights work has been since 1948. 
 Restrictiveness would endanger the human security perspective of 
interconnection, and is thereby less suitable as a perspective for research, 
mobilization, and civil society engagement – the way towards major long run impact. 
Bosold & Werthes (2005) suggest that the narrow focus can be better for short-run 
campaigns on immediate graspable goals, like the land mines ban and the 
International Criminal Court; whereas the broader Japanese focus is better for the 
longer-run, since it sees deeper causes and effects, and can appeal to wider 
constituencies. As theorised in the Great Transition Initiative‘s scenarios of how a 
shift to more sustainable societies could eventually transpire (e.g. Raskin et al., 2002), 
young people provide the energy for social movements, which generate and transmit 
the pressure and ideas for change, which can be picked up at times of eventual crisis 
and openness to reorientation when Governments and other agencies must seek new 
responses. Discourses that make more radical points are likely to be ignored in short 
run policy, but have a different rationale and time perspective.  
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5 – Concluding thoughts 
 
The powerful opposition encountered by the broad human security discourse was our 
starting point, for why then does it continue to spread despite limited powerholder 
patronage? We looked at actual employment of the concept, since: ‗The meaning lies 
not in what people consciously think the concept means but in how they implicitly use 
it in some ways and not others.‘ (Buzan et al., 1998: 24.) We have teased out a 
number of aspects in addition to the prioritising role of any ‗security‘ concept:- the 
artificiality and arbitrariness of claims that security is exclusively a national-level and 
military notion, and of attempts to restrict ideas of human security to one type of 
threat or one type of harm; the idea of basic normative threshold levels, across a range 
of needs, typically related to ideas of danger and vulnerability around causative 
threshold levels or tipping-points in systems marked by ramifying interconnections; 
and the visceral charge of the idea of ‗human security‘, as reflection of the 
vulnerabilities of human bodies, identities and personality. 
 Section 2 followed up the insight that ‗human security‘ is a discourse, not merely 
a single concept. We highlighted an equity dimension, in which ideas from human 
needs, human development and human rights are combined, including a priority to 
living a life of normal human span; and two connectivity dimensions, including a 
holistic perspective on real individuals‘ lives and a trans-disciplinary approach to 
explanation at the level of larger systems. Section 3 examined roles of this discourse: 
in generating situation-specific and unexpected insights, and in focusing policy design 
on foundational prevention rather than on palliative reaction to already erupted crises; 
and we considered who currently are the users and non-users. 
 Section 4 reviewed attacks on the idea of human security, especially on the 
broader versions. Against the claim that broad versions are unusable for analysis and 
explanation, we saw that they are increasingly used, often combined with case-
specific focusing, and can be dramatically insightful (see e.g. Picciotto et al., 2007). 
Against the claim that broad versions are bad for establishing priorities, we saw that 
they emphasise prioritisation within sectors (as in the MDGs work) and, precisely 
thanks to their broad formulation, also between sectors. Against the claim that broad 
versions are politically impotent, we saw that while ramifying explanation tends to be 
unpopular with established interests, a short term orientation to immediate graspable 
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goals is not the only relevant stance. A broader approach has potential for eventual 
broader and deeper support, towards longer term change. 
 Werthes and Debiel conclude that ‗human security‘ is a political leitmotif. 
‗[O]veremphasising the shortcomings of leitmotifs means to underestimate their 
potential, which exactly relies on its ambiguity/flexibility‘ (2006: 15; sic). This 
formulation is similar in spirit to Alkire‘s definition which was taken over by the 
Commission on Human Security. Thus, Japan can handle the leitmotif in a way that 
reflects its own history, culture and politics, with a focus on human needs and human 
development (Atanassova-Cornelis 2006; Werthes & Debiel 2006); whereas the EU 
must give a strong role to human rights in whatever human security orientation it 
adopts (op.cit.). Not every flexibly interpreted version of human security will attain 
impact in its environment. The Japanese and Canadian interpretations have led to 
some real movement, in different arenas, but whether the EU‘s human security talk 
makes any difference is still open to doubt (ibid.: 18). 
 Werthes and Debiel helpfully point us to multiple users, interpretations, and uses. 
But their focus on direct policy uses by current policy users understates the potential 
of human security discourse, which has become a motivating framework in diverse 
sectors and professional contexts. Like some other commentators from international 
relations, they may insufficiently consider the ‗human‘ perspectives in ‗human 
security‘. Human security thinking operates then both at more general levels—as a 
widely used concept, ideal and discourse in description, explanation and policy 
design—and at more concrete levels, as specified in particular research programmes 
and policy programmes. The more general levels of thinking inspire the more 
concrete and specific research and policy; they motivate integration across 
boundaries: organisational, ideological and disciplinary. They do this in varied, 
unpredictable, niche-specific ways, as we see from the work in spheres such as violent 
conflict, AIDS and public health, climate change and migration. Concrete and precise 
research and policy programmes do not require that we establish a single narrow 
conception of human security, let alone one that is centred on safety from intentional 
physical violence. The causes and knock-on effects of damage through violence are so 
ramifying that while violence appears convenient as focus for data collection and 
subsequent model-building, the associated research and policy are forced to ramify. A 
narrow frame provides no selfenclosed analytical coherence. We cannot afford to 
ignore wider causes and effects and to treat the latter as externalities that will be 
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absorbed by the human and natural environments. The world contains too much 
interconnection, fragility, and risk of straying past tipping points.  
 
 
 
References 
Alkire, S. (2003) ‗A conceptual framework for human security‘, CRISE Working Paper 2, Queen 
Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. 
Atanassova-Cornelis, E., 2006. Defining and Implementing Human Security: The Case of Japan. In: 
Debiel, T., Werthes, S., 2006; 39-51.  
Barnett, J., 2007. Climate Change Science and Policy in the South Pacific, as if People Mattered. 
Chpater in this volume. 
Bauman, Z., 1994. Alone Again: Ethics after Certainty. London: Demos. 
Betts, A., Eagleton-Pierce, M., 2005. Editorial Introduction: Human Security. St. Antony’s 
International Review, 1(2), 5-10. 
Bilgin, P., 2003. Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security. International Studies Review, 5, 203-
222.  
Bosold, D., 2005/6. (Re-)Constructing Canada‘s Human Security Agenda. www.staff.uni-
marburg.de/~bosold/pdf/Reconstructing_HumanSecurity_Oslo.pdf  
Bosold, D., Werthes, S., 2005. Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese Experiences. 
Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft/International Politics and Society, 1/2005: 84-101. 
Brauch, H-G., (2005?), outline of Brauch, H-G., et al (eds.) 2007. Globalisation and Environmental 
Challenges: Reconceptualising Security in the 21st Century. Berlin: Springer Verlag. 
Buzan, B., Waever, O., de Wilde, J., 1998. Security: A new framework for analysis. Boulder, CO. 
Carafano,  J.J., and Janice A. Smith, 2006. The Muddled Notion of ―Human Security‖ at the U.N. 
Heritage Foundation: http://www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/bg1966.cfm, 
Backgrounder #1966. 
CHS, 2003. Human Security Now. New York: UN Secretary-General‘s Commission on Human 
Security. http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/ 
Davis, M., 2001, Late Victorian Holocausts, London and New York: Verso. 
Debiel, T., Werthes, S. (eds.), 2006. Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: changes, concepts, 
cases, INEF Report 80/2006, Duisburg: University of Duisburg-Essen.  
Edson, S., 2001. Human Security: an extended and annotated bibliography. Cambridge: Centre for 
History and Economics, King‘s College.  
 http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/meetings/first/bibliography.pdf (8 Oct. 2007). 
Gasper, D., 1999. ‗Drawing a Line‘ - ethical and political strategies in complex emergency assistance, 
European J. of Development Research, 11(2), 87-115. 
Gasper, D., 2005, ‗Securing Humanity – Situating ―Human Security‖ as Concept and Discourse‘, J. of 
Human Development, 6(2), 221-245. 
Gasper, D., 2007: Human Rights, Human Needs, Human Development, Human Security – 
Relationships between four international ‗human‘ discourses. Forum for Development Studies 
(NUPI, Oslo), 2007/1, 9-43 
Gasper, D., 2008: From ‗Hume‘s Law‘ To Policy Analysis For Human Development - Sen after 
Dewey, Myrdal, Streeten, Stretton and Haq. Review of Political Economy. 
Gasper, D., & T-D. Truong, 2005: Deepening Development Ethics – From economism to human 
development to human security. European J. of Development Research, 17(3), 372-384.  
Ginkel, H. van, & Newman, E., 2000, In Quest of ―Human Security‖, Japan Review of International 
Affairs, Vol.14, No.1, Spring 2000. 
Hamber, B., P. Hillyard, A. Maguire, M. McWilliams, G. Robinson, D. Russell, M. Ward, 2006. 
Discourses in Transition: Re-Imagining Women‘s Security. International Relations, 20(4), 487-
502. 
Hough, Peter (2005) ―Who‘s Securing Whom? The Need for International Relations to Embrace 
Human Security‖, St Antony’s International Review 1 (2): 72-87. 
Jolly, R., L. Emmerij, D. Ghai, F. Lapeyre, 2004. UN Contributions to Development Thinking and 
Practice. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press. 
Jolly, R., and D. BasuRay, 2007, ‗Human Security – national perspectives and global agendas‘, J. of 
International Development, 19(4), 457-472. Longer earlier version as UNDP Occasional Paper on 
National Human Development Reports, no.5, 2006. 
 25 
Lee, S-W., 2004. Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in East 
Asia. Seoul: Korean National Commission for UNESCO. 
Lodgaard, S., 2000: Human Security – concept and operationalization. Paper for UN University for 
Peace.  http://www.upeace.org/documents/resources%5Creport_lodgaard.doc (8 Oct. 2007) 
MacArthur, J., 2007. A Responsibility to Rethink? Challenging Paradigms in Human Security. Paper to 
Symposium on Resolving Threats to Global Security, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S. Canada. 
MacFarlane, N., and Khong Y.F., 2006. Human Security and the UN – A Critical History, 
Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press. 
Mack, A. 2005. Human Security Report. Vancouver, Human Security Centre: University of British 
Columbia Press. 
O‘Brien, K., 2009. Shifting the Discourse: Climate Change as an Environmental Issue versus Climate 
Change as a Human Security Issue. In this volume. 
Owen, T., 2005. Conspicuously Absent? Why the Secretary General Used Human Security in All But 
Name. St. Anthony’s International Review, 1(2), 37-42. 
Picciotto, R.. 2005. Memorandum submitted to Select Committee on International Development, 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/464/5031502, UK House of 
Commons. 
----, F. Olonisakin, M. Clarke, 2006. Global Development and Human Security, Stockholm: Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs.  
----, F. Olonisakin, M. Clarke, 2007. Global Development and Human Security, Transaction Publishers 
/ Springer. 
Raskin, P. et al, 2002. Great Transition. http://www.tellus.org/Publications/Great_Transitions.pdf 
Rothschild, Emma (1995) ‗What is Security?‘. Daedalus, Vol.124, No.3, 53-98. 
Sen, A.K., 2007. Mahbub-ul-Haq memorial lecture, New School University, New York, 19 September. 
Truong, T-D., 2005, Human Security and Human Rights. In Smith, R., & C. van den Anker (eds.), The 
Essentials of Human Rights, London: Hodder Arnold, pp. 172-175. 
UNDP, 2003. Latvia Human Development Report: 2002-2003: Human Security. 
http://www.undp.lv/?object_id=633 
Weiss, T.G., T. Carayannis, L. Emmerij, R. Jolly, 2005. UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and 
Social Justice. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Werthes, S., D. Bosold, 2006. Caught Between Pretension and Substantiveness – Ambiguities of 
Human Security as a Political Leitmotif. In: Debiel, T., Werthes, S., 2006; 21-38. 
Werthes, S., T. Debiel, 2006. Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas. Introduction to Debiel, T., 
Werthes, S., 2006; 7-20.  
Wolfers, Arnold, 1962: ―National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol‖, in: Wolfers, Arnold: Discord 
and Collaboration. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press): 147-165. 
